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  This paper asserts that a significant increase in public funding for climate change 
research and development (R&D) is needed in the United States.  While additional public 
R&D funding alone is unlikely to provide a sufficient policy response to climate change, 
it is a critical policy component in an effective long-run strategy.  Different possibilities 
for generating additional public revenues for R&D funding are considered.  The analysis 
demonstrates that quite modest taxes on carbon emissions or gasoline could fund a 
significant increase in public R&D funding for clean energy.  As an alternative to tax 
instruments, the paper also considers a program of voluntary retirement contributions to a 
clean energy fund.  These clean energy retirement accounts (CERAs) would allow 
individuals to directly contribute to a fund that would be used exclusively to support 
climate change-related R&D.  Specifically, the paper suggests that CERA funds be used 
to offer low-interest loans to private firms and to form private-public partnerships 
pursuing the long-term development of clean energy technologies.  Loan repayment and 
the eventual profitability of some partnerships will at least partially fund payments to 
CERA holders when they retire.  Using reasonable assumptions, a simulation analysis 
demonstrates the financial feasibility of the program and the conditions in which the 
program would be fully self-funding.
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  Global emissions of carbon dioxide, the primary greenhouse gas, have risen about 
30 percent since 1990.  Projections indicate that in the absence of effective climate 
change policies global CO2 emissions could increase a further 60 to 70 percent by 2030, 
with continued growth in emissions beyond that (US Department of Energy, 2006a; 
International Energy Agency, 2005). It is becoming increasingly clear that the global 
growth of CO2 emissions needs to be halted and eventually reversed during the 21
st 
century in order to avoid potentially catastrophic effects from global climate change.  The 
recent much-publicized Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change notes that 
climate stabilization at an atmospheric concentration of 550 parts per million CO2-
equivalent would require global emissions to peak in the next ten to twenty years and 
then fall to 25 percent below current levels by 2050, with further declines thereafter 
(Stern, 2006).  Climate stabilization even at this level could result in significant negative 
effects including reduced crop yields, increased water shortages, and ecological damages. 
 
  Thus there exists a large ‘mitigation gap’ between projected carbon emissions and 
the level of emissions necessary to achieve climate stabilization that moderates the risk of 
adverse climate change.  Closing this gap will require significant, coordinated, and wide-
ranging policy action.  However, the most comprehensive policy response to climate 
change to-date, the Kyoto Protocol, will produce only a limited beneficial impact, 
especially since the United States has withdrawn from the treaty.  The U.S. is the world’s 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases, yet current federal policy does not place any limits 
on emissions of CO2.  The George W. Bush administration has instead pursued voluntary 
and incentive-based programs, while U.S. emissions of CO2 continue to increase.  U.S. 
Department of Energy projections estimate a 36 percent increase in total CO2 emissions 
between 2006 and 2030 (US Department of Energy, 2006b). 
 
  An effective global response to climate change will require much stronger policy 
efforts in the U.S.  The Bush administration has tended to focus on the potential of 
technological advances, using policy to ‘encourage research breakthroughs that lead to 
technological innovation’ (Office of the Press Secretary, 2001).  In his 2007 State of the 
Union speech, the President stated the importance of diversifying U.S. energy supply and 
that ‘the way forward is through technology’. While significant progress on reducing 
carbon emissions will undoubtedly require much more sweeping measures, such as 
comprehensive carbon cap-and-trade legislation, technological innovations are clearly a 
critical component of an adequate response to the challenge of global climate change.  
This paper argues that a significant increase in U.S. public funding for climate change 
research and development (R&D) is needed.  While additional public R&D funding alone 
is unlikely to provide a sufficient policy response, it is a critical policy component in an 
effective long-run strategy.  Different possibilities for generating additional public 
revenues for R&D funding are considered.  The analysis demonstrates that quite modest 
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taxes on carbon emissions or gasoline could fund a significant increase in public R&D 
funding for clean energy.  As an alternative to tax instruments, the paper also considers a 
program of voluntary retirement contributions to a clean energy fund. 
 
 
Public Policy Responses to Climate Change 
 
  Two types of market failure prevent an adequate response to climate change from 
unregulated private markets (US Congressional Budget Office, 2006).  First, the negative 
externalities associated with carbon emissions are not reflected in market prices.  The 
most common proposal to address this market failure is carbon taxation at a level that 
reflects the social costs of carbon emissions, or a cap-and-trade system with comparable 
effects on carbon pricing.  The second market failure is an insufficient level of private 
research and development on clean energy technologies because the benefits of such 
innovations cannot be fully captured by the innovating firm.  This market failure suggests 
the need to supplement private R&D with public R&D funding for technologies that 
could potentially promote climate stabilization. 
 
  The emphasis of most policy proposals to address climate change is on carbon 
pricing.  Economic models estimating the relative effectiveness of carbon taxation and 
R&D subsidies suggest that pricing policies alone are much more cost effective than 
R&D subsidies alone but that overall cost effectiveness is achieved by a combination of 
both policies (US Congressional Budget Office, 2006).  While public R&D funds 
promote the development of new technologies, in the absence of higher carbon prices 
there may not exist any incentive to adopt those technologies (Popp, 2004). 
 
  Even in the presence of a socially optimal price for carbon, private R&D on clean 
energy technology will still be undersupplied.  One problem is that in the case of climate 
change the benefits of private investment may accrue outside of the short-term planning 
horizon of most firms. Thus many technologies that could make a significant contribution 
to carbon mitigation in the long term may fail to be commercialized without determined 
policy intervention (International Energy Agency, 2006b). 
 
  Second, the benefits of innovations do not fully accrue to the innovating firm.  
Beneficiaries also include other firms and society as a whole.  Research suggests that the 
social rates of return on R&D investments can be in the range of 30 to 50 percent while 
private rates of return fall in the range of 7 to 15 percent (Popp, 2004).  The gap between 
social and private rates of return is likely to be greatest in the case of basic research: 
 
  Federal support would probably be most cost-effective if it went toward basic 
research on technologies that are in the early stages of development. Such research is 
more likely to be underfunded in the absence of government support because it is more 
likely to create knowledge that is beneficial to other firms but that does not generate 
profits for the firm conducting the research. (US Congressional Budget Office, 2006, p. 
2) 
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  Similarly, a review article by Salter and Martin (2001) states that ‘the limited 
evidence gathered to date indicates that publicly funded basic research does have a large 
positive payoff’ (p. 514) although they note methodological difficulties in estimating the 
benefits quantitatively.   
 
  A third problem is that there exists considerable uncertainty regarding which 
technologies will prevail in a low-carbon society.  Given that some technologies will fail 
for technical or economic reasons, a portfolio approach to clean energy investment is 
required.  Directed public R&D investments could ensure research on the widest range of 
technologies, not just those that present the greatest possibility of short-term profits.  
Numerous technological advances will be required for a sustainable future and a portfolio 
approach will greatly reduce the risks should some technologies fail (International 
Energy Agency, 2006a). 
 
  The Stern Review advocates a complementary approach of higher carbon taxes 
and increased public R&D funding.  The report notes that despite growing concern over 
climate change, both private and public energy R&D is generally declining.  Public 
energy R&D funding by the 26 industrial nations of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) peaked at about $18 billion annually (in 2004 dollars) in 1980 in response to the 
energy crises of the 1970s.  Funding by these countries has since fallen to about half this 
level.  The Stern Review promotes a doubling of public R&D funding for low-carbon 
technologies as an initial step (Stern, 2006).   
 
  Public energy investment should be seen as complementary to, rather than 
competitive with, private investment.  In particular, public R&D should focus on clean 
energy technologies that are currently far from market feasibility but that offer the 
greatest potential for substantial carbon reductions.  Private investment, particularly in 
the presence of higher carbon prices, will tend to focus on technologies that offer near-
term market profitability.  For example, private R&D might focus on the development of 
more efficient gas-electric hybrid engines while public R&D would concentrate on the 
development of hydrogen fuel cells as a replacement power plant for vehicles. This 
complementary process is already occurring as energy market liberalization has 
motivated private firms to concentrate more on short-term R&D while government 
research shifts towards a longer-term focus (International Energy Agency, 2003a). 
 
  The IEA notes that a future scenario of rapid technological development does not 
necessarily imply reduced economic growth.  In a scenario of significant technological 
change responding to environmental concerns: 
 
  Growth would be slower at the beginning in developed countries, due to the 
increased costs of providing energy in a more environmentally compatible way. 
However, as the system responds and technology advances, the net increase in energy 
prices may not be that big. Furthermore, technological innovation by creating successful 
new industries and environment-friendly products would foster new economic growth.  
(International Energy Agency, 2003b, p. 92) 
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  In this IEA scenario, governments aim to improve technologies through a ‘mix of 
government-industry partnerships in R&D and regulation’.  Again, a long-term 
perspective is required that stresses basic research on a broad range of technological 
options.  Even if a concerted technology push were to begin immediately, successful new 
technologies might not be introduced into the market until at least 2020.  A simulation 
model by Edenhofer, et al. (2005) produces similar results regarding the relationship 
between economic growth and climate policy – investment in technological change in the 
renewable energy and carbon capture sectors significantly reduces the costs of climate 
protection and allows ambitious climate goals to be met, while still permitting stable 
economic growth.   
 
  In the IEA scenario referred to above, the US is not expected to participate in the 
Kyoto process in the near term.  Yet if the US adopts a long-term climate change policy 
emphasizing aggressive technological development, it may be able to speed up the 
introduction of new technologies that will eventually bring down the price of carbon 
mitigation and lead to a more successful international accord subsequent to the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, meanwhile, may face greater 
pressure to take short-term measures to meet their Kyoto targets. Thus, the U.S. refusal to 
participate in the Kyoto Protocol could, ironically, offer it a unique opportunity to take a 




Public and Private Energy R&D Funding 
 
  In 2006 public energy R&D funding in the IEA countries was $10.9 billion (in 
2006 dollars).  As seen in Figure 1, R&D funding among industrial countries is 
dominated by Japan and the United States.  In the United States, public R&D energy 
funding peaked in 1979 at $8.5 billion (in 2006 dollars) but in 2006 stood at only 37 
percent of this amount, or $3.2 billion.  Since the early 1990s Japan has been the world’s 
leader in public R&D energy funding, with a 2006 total of $3.6 billion.  In 2006 Japan 
and the United States accounted for 62 percent of the total public R&D energy funding 
among the 26 nations of the IEA. Only a few industrial countries are consistently 
increasing R&D energy funding.  The IEA country with the greatest recent increase in 
funding is South Korea, which increased its public R&D energy funding by 258 percent 
between 2002 and 2006.  
 
  The decline in energy research funding in the United States is even more 
pronounced for private R&D.  Between 1985 and 1999 private R&D energy expenditures 
declined by 66 percent in real terms, from $4.1 billion to $1.4 billion (World Energy 
Council, 2001).  Dooley (1998) suggests that energy market deregulation is driving the 
decline in private R&D in the U.S.  In a deregulated market, private energy companies 
are directing their remaining R&D towards proprietary technologies with the potential for 
short-term payback.  Thus there is likely to be little private investment in such 
technologies as advanced solar and wind energy since few firms are currently profitable 
enough to maintain research programs on these technologies without public funding 
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assistance.  Dooley also indicates the importance of continuity in funding energy 
research.  A crash public program to develop low-carbon energy technologies is unlikely 
to produce satisfactory results because of its dependency on a wide range of scientific 
disciplines. 
 
  Public R&D funding appears to be particularly important with respect to 
renewable energy.  For example, of fourteen key innovations in the field of photovoltaic 
energy where the funding source could be identified, nine were developed totally with 
public funding, four as a result of public-private partnerships, and only one solely from 
private funding (Norberg-Bohm, 2000).  A strength of public U.S. R&D funding for 
photovoltaic energy has been the attention paid to a wide range of research activities, 
including basic research.  But progress has been limited partly due to the inconsistency of 































































Figure 1    Public R&D Energy Funding, Selected IEA Countries, 1975- 2006 
Source: Online IEA R&D Statistics Database, 2007 Edition. 
 
 
The Role of Technology and R&D Funding in U.S. Climate Policy  
 
  Under the George W. Bush administration the United States set a goal of reducing 
greenhouse gas intensity by eighteen percent by 2012 as compared to 2002 levels. 
Greenhouse gas intensity is measured as total emissions divided by economic output. 
Reducing greenhouse gas intensity does not imply actually reducing emissions.  Instead, 
it merely implies that emissions grow less rapidly than economic output.  Analysis by the 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2002) indicates that the administration’s plan 
would allow actual emissions to increase 12 percent over the 2002-2012 period.  Further, 
given that greenhouse gas intensity fell by 21 percent during the 1980s and by 16 percent 
in the 1990s, the plan essentially amounts to a business-as-usual approach. 
 
  The United States has developed a strategic plan on the role of technology in 
addressing climate change (US Climate Change Technology Program, 2006).  The 
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climate change response of the United States “places special emphasis on the 
fundamental importance of science and technology as a means of achieving climate 
goals” (p. 2).  Like the IEA scenarios, the strategic plan also recognizes the compatibility 
of technological advancement and economic growth: 
 
‘… accelerated advances in technology have the potential to facilitate progress towards 
meeting climate change goals and, under certain assumptions, to significantly reduce the 
cost of such progress over the course of the 21st century, compared to what otherwise 
would be the case without accelerated advances in technology. Further, it is expected that 
the new technologies would create substantial opportunities for economic growth.’ (US 
Climate Change Technology Program, p. 7) 
 
  Among the goals set forth in the plan is the objective of increasing basic scientific 
research, including innovating research that offers the potential for breakthrough 
technologies.  The strategic plan recognizes the need for a portfolio approach that hedges 
against risk by investing in a wide array of technologies.  In addition, the plan seeks to 
“encourage further formation of public-private partnerships as a common mode of 
conducting R&D portfolio planning and program execution” (p. 215). However, in 
contrast to the recommendations of the Stern Review and the IEA, the US strategic plan 
does not specifically call for an increase of public R&D funding.   
 
  The President's Council of Advisors on Science & Technology (PCAST) under 
President Clinton did call for an increase in R&D funding related to environmental 
threats: 
 
‘PCAST believes that the United States is underinvesting in the R&D needed to 
understand, anticipate, adapt to, and mitigate emerging environmental threats.
1    In 
addition to sustaining or increasing its own R&D investments, the Federal government 
will need to forge new partnerships with the many businesses, industries, and 
nongovernmental organizations that are working today to advance sustainable 
development through substantial R&D investments, strategic planning, effective 
environmental management systems, and outreach programs.’ (PCAST, 1997) 
 
  The bipartisan National Commission on Energy Policy (2004) has recommended 
a doubling of US public funding of energy R&D while promoting effective private-pubic 
partnerships.  Nemet and Kammen (2007) conclude that increasing public energy R&D 
by a factor of two or more is necessary and feasible in light of previous large-scale 
government R&D efforts such as the Manhattan Project and Apollo Program. 
 
 
Scenario For Increased Us Public R&D Funding Related To Climate Change 
 
  The case for a significant increase in US public R&D funding to address climate 
change appears compelling. If we accept that the U.S. is under-investing in climate 
                                                 
1 Emphasis from original. 
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change R&D, by how much should funding levels be increased?  This paper considers 
three alternative funding levels.  First, following the recommendations of Stern and the 
National Commission on Energy Policy, a doubling of U.S. public R&D funding would 
require an additional $3.2 billion per year.  Second, returning to the peak U.S. annual 
investment in energy R&D achieved in 1979 would require a $5.0 billion/year increase in 
funding.  Finally, we consider an ambitious scenario in which the US unilaterally 
commits to undertake the global recommendation of the Stern Review – doubling global 
R&D funding – with an increased expenditure of $11.0 billion/year.  We now consider 
alternatives for raising the additional funds for each of these funding increases. 
 
  Before considering alternatives for raising the necessary funds under these 
different scenarios, it is worthwhile to place these values in context.  Additional federal 
spending of $3.2-$11.0 billion annually is quite minor when compared to total federal 
spending ($2,568 billion in 2006) and spending for other priorities (for example, the war 
in Iraq cost over $90 billion in 2006 according to the Congressional Budget Office). A 
relatively minor adjustment of federal spending priorities could shift an additional $3.2-
$11.0 billion towards climate change R&D.  Another approach would be to obtain the 
additional funds with a broad-based but small tax increase.  For example, raising an 
additional $3.2 billion in taxes would equate to an additional $28 annually per US 




Increasing R&D Funding Using Environmental Taxes 
 
  One option for generating additional R&D funding is carbon taxation, either as a 
direct carbon tax or as revenue from the auctioning of carbon permits under a cap-and-
trade scheme.  Numerous studies have provided estimates of the socially optimal level of 
carbon taxation by calculating the present value of damages from carbon emissions.  A 
literature review by Tol (2005) found large variance in carbon damage estimates.  Based 
on 28 studies, the mean carbon damage estimate was $93 per ton but the median was only 
$14/ton, and the 90 percent confidence interval was -$10 to $350/ton.
2  The primary 
reason for the large difference in carbon damage estimates was the variation in 
researchers’ choice of a discount rate.  Tol concludes that it ‘is unlikely that the marginal 
damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions exceed $50/tC and are likely to be 
substantially smaller than that’ (Tol, 2005, p. 2073).  This conclusion has been disputed 
by other analysts (see e.g. Ackerman and Finlayson, 2006).  The Stern Review, for 
example, estimates the social cost of carbon at over $300/ton.  To put these figures in 
context, a carbon tax of $10/ton would increase the price of oil by about 1%, the price of 
natural gas by about 3%, and the price of coal by about 23% (Harris and Roach, 2007).   
 
  Carbon taxation has met with considerable resistance in the U.S., and instituting a 
significant broad carbon tax appears unlikely in the immediate future.  This analysis 
considers whether a less ambitious carbon tax could raise the funds necessary to permit a 
 
2 Note that a tax of $14/ton of carbon would equate to a tax of $3.81/ton of CO2. 
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dramatic increase in public funding for energy R&D.  Total carbon dioxide emissions in 
the U.S. in 2006 were 5.9 billion tons (US Department of Energy, 2008).  Assuming all 
carbon emissions could be taxed, a doubling of US energy R&D funding could be met 
with a carbon tax of only about 50 cents per ton (See Table 1). Even in the most 
ambitious scenario, where the US alone doubles global energy R&D funding, a tax of 
only $1.87/ton of carbon dioxide would be necessary.  Thus even a relatively small tax on 
carbon emissions in the U.S., well below most estimates of the socially efficient carbon 
tax, could be used to fund a large increase in public funding for climate change research. 
 
  For reasons of practicality and administration, it may not be feasible to tax all 
carbon emissions.  Table 1 also considers the effect of taxing only commercial and 
industrial emissions, currently about 2.7 billion tons annually.  Again, the carbon tax 
levels necessary to raise additional R&D funds are relatively modest, and significantly 
below most estimates of carbon damages. 
 
  The final policy option considered in Table 1 is a tax solely on gasoline.  Unlike 
carbon taxation, a tax on gasoline would not require monitoring of all carbon emissions.  
The current federal tax on gasoline is 18.4 cents per gallon, with state taxes ranging from 
six to 42 cents per gallon (American Petroleum Institute, 2006).  Total gasoline 
consumption in the U.S. in 2006 was 9,233 thousand barrels per day, or 142 billion 
gallons annually (US Department of Energy, 2007).  Thus US funding of energy R&D 
could be doubled with a new gasoline tax of only about two cents per gallon.  
Alternatively, the U.S. could effectively double global R&D funding with a gasoline tax 
of 7.8 cents per gallon.  As with carbon taxation, an additional gas tax of two to eight 
cents per gallon would still leave gas taxes in the U.S. well below socially efficient levels 





of $3.2 Billion 
Funding Increase 
























Tax on only 
gasoline 
2.3 cents/gal.  3.5 cents/gal. 7.8  cents/gal. 
 
Table.1   Cost of Increased Public Energy R&D Funding 
 
 
Clean Energy Retirement Accounts  
 
  The estimates cited above suggest that a dramatic increase in public funding for 
climate change R&D in the US could be paid for with relatively minor taxes applied to 
carbon emissions or gasoline.  Of course, any of these new taxes could be countered by a 
decrease in existing taxes to make the policy revenue neutral.  But recognizing the 
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political difficulties of instituting new taxes in the US, we will consider a final option for 
raising the necessary revenue to permit an increase in public R&D funding for climate 
change research.  The proposal is that individuals could voluntarily set up clean energy 
retirement accounts (CERAs) similar to existing Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).  
Like IRAs, contributions to CERAs would offer tax advantages and provide retirement 
income. But while IRA contributions are made using various private investment 
instruments such as stocks and mutual funds, contributions to CERAs would be made to 
the federal government. The revenue raised would then be used solely to address global 
climate change.  CERAs would also offer individuals a simple opportunity to increase 
personal savings, something that is particularly needed given the recent decline in savings 
in the US. 
 
  Most Americans indicate that climate change is a serious problem and that the 
country is currently not doing enough to address the problem.  In a January 2007 poll by 
CBS News, 70 percent of Americans stated that they believed climate change is an 
environmental problem currently having a serious impact (pollingreport.com, 2007).  In a 
March 2006 ABC News poll, 68 percent of Americans said that ‘the federal government 
should do more than it's doing now to try to deal with global warming.’  The public is 
overwhelmingly in favor of federal policies promoting R& D on issues related to climate 
change.  In a March 2006 Gallup poll, 85 percent favored spending government money to 
develop alternative fuel sources for automobiles and 77 percent favored spending 
government money to develop solar and wind power.  In a January 2007 UPI-Zogby 
International poll 55 percent of respondents said that ‘increased government investment 
in looking into alternative sources would be the best way to encourage development of 
renewable forms of energy’ (United Press International, 2007).  Another 27 percent of 
respondents to this survey favored tax breaks to small business or individuals who 
purchase a hybrid vehicle as the best way to encourage renewable energy development.  
 
  These surveys suggest that broad support exists for public funding of climate 
change-related R&D, but people are less enthusiastic when it comes to paying higher 
taxes to support such funding – in the ABC News poll mentioned above only 19 percent 
approved of addressing climate change with higher electricity taxes and 31 percent 
approved of setting higher gasoline taxes.  CERAs offer an opportunity to raise additional 
revenue for climate change-related R&D without raising current taxes or shifting federal 
spending priorities.  
 
CERA Revenue Potential 
 
  Some idea of the amount of revenue that could be generated from CERAs can be 
obtained by looking at charitable contributions in the U.S.  In 2003 charitable 
contributions to environmental causes totaled $7 billion (US State Department, 2005) and 
in 2005 environmental contributions grew by 16 percent, faster growth than most other 
sectors (Giving USA, 2006).  Public willingness to pay to avert significant climate 
change may actually be much higher than these figures imply.  In a 1997-98 contingent 
valuation survey by Cameron (2005), average willingness to pay to prevent noticeable 
climate change, in terms of higher prices and/or taxes, was $228 per month.  In another 
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contingent valuation survey by Berrens, et al. (2004), households were willing to pay an 
average of $200 to $1,760 annually, depending on the sample and modeling approach, in 
terms of higher energy and gasoline prices to support US ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  These surveys suggest that the willingness to pay to prevent climate change 
among US citizens is well above the $3.2-$11.0 billion assumed in the three scenarios 
proposed here for increasing energy R&D funding.  Of course, these surveys only present 
costs to respondents while the proposed CERA program would offer the potential for 
financial gains. 
 
  It is also useful to consider how much U.S. taxpayers currently contribute to 
voluntary retirement programs.  According to IRS statistics, in 2000 contributions to IRA 
plans, including traditional IRAs, Roth IRAs, and SEP IRAs, totaled $36.5 billion (Sailer 
and Nutter, 2004).  In 2001 payments to defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)s and 
403(b)s, exceeded $200 billion (US Census Bureau, 2007).  The evidence also suggests 
that IRA plans are significantly underutilized.  In 2000 less than ten percent of all tax 
filers who were eligible for IRA contributions actually made contributions (Sailer and 
Nutter, 2004).  IRA participation rates are particularly low for lower-income and young 
taxpayers.  Only six percent of those with adjusted gross incomes below $50,000 
contributed to an IRA in 2000.  The contribution rate for tax payers under age 40 was 
seven percent.   
 
  The underutilization of IRAs reflects a broader trend towards reduced personal 
savings.  The personal savings rate in the United States has been less than one percent, or 
even negative, since early 2005 (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008).  About 44 
percent of American households did not save in 2004, up from 41 percent in 2001 
(Bucks, et al., 2006).  The lack of sufficient voluntary savings for retirement may be 
exacerbated in the future as a result of a projected shortfall in Social Security payments 
beginning in 2040 (US Social Security Administration, 2006).  All these data suggest an 
important need to increase retirement savings, particularly for lower- and middle-income 
households (Duflo, et al., 2005). 
 
  CERAs present a retirement-savings instrument that could offer several unique 
features.  First, unlike other retirement plans, a CERA would be oriented around a public 
policy issue with broad support.  While CERAs would offer the opportunity for financial 
returns, as discussed in more detail below, contributions to the plan would also be an 
investment in long-term environmental quality.  In recent years there has been a growing 
interest in investments screened for social and environmental performance.  Socially-
responsible investments have become an increasing share of total U.S. mutual fund assets 
(Social Investment Forum, 2006).  CERAs would represent another option for savers to 
integrate their financial objectives with their personal values. 
 
  The CERA program should be structured to offer an uncomplicated opportunity 
for investing.    With existing IRA and voluntary supplemental retirement programs, 
participation rates may be adversely affected by administrative requirements.  Consider 
the results of one study showing that participation rates in a large company’s 401(k) went 
from around 50 percent to 90 percent when the company switch from voluntary 
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enrollment to automatic enrollment with an opt-out, without changing any other 
characteristics of the plan (Madrian and Shea, 2001).  Participation rates in CERAs could 
be maximized by allowing contributions through automatic deductions from one’s 
paycheck and/or direct allocations when completing one’s federal income tax form. 
 
  A CERA program could appeal to both ends of the political spectrum.  The plan 
offers individuals the opportunity to maintain personal accounts to supplement Social 
Security – a concept that many conservatives endorse.  Of course, CERA contributions 
would be used to combat climate change rather than invested in the stock market.  But 
CERAs still offer individuals an additional personal choice regarding their retirement 
portfolio. Another appealing feature to conservatives is that the plan does not require an 
increase in current taxes.  Conservatives have also tended to prefer a technology-based 
approach to responding to climate change as opposed to an approach based on carbon 
pricing.  On the other hand, the CERA program should appeal to environmentalists 
seeking to increase the US response to climate change.  CERAs could move the US into 
an international leadership role in planning for a future based on renewable energy 
sources.  
 
  As proposed here, the CERA program would have a limited duration.  The 
objective would be to advance low-carbon technologies to the point of financial 
competitiveness with fossil fuels or sufficient market penetration to put the US well along 
a path of lower overall carbon emissions.  Eventually CERA contributions would be 
phased out, but since CERAs are retirement plan instruments, payments to CERA holders 
would still need to be made beyond the point when contributions cease. As with IRAs, 
withdrawals from CERAs would not be permitted without penalty until the account 
holder reaches a specific age.  For example, withdrawals from IRAs are generally not 
permitted without penalty until the holder reaches age 59½.  Thus in the early years of a 
CERA program, payments to account holders would be negligible, but then gradually 
increase as account holders reached retirement age. 
 
CERA Financial Returns 
 
  Participation rates in a CERA program would depend on the possibility of 
positive financial rates of return.  One way to encourage participation would be to 
guarantee a minimum rate of return, essentially transferring most risk from the investor to 
the federal government.  As one example, the minimum return could be set equal to the 
implicit rate of return on Social Security taxes.  Implicit nominal rates of return for 
current retirees are around four percent but rates vary widely according to one’s income 
level and demographic characteristics (US Government Accountability Office, 1999).  
Another approach would be to set the minimum rate of return equal to the interest rate on 
long-term government bonds, about 4.5 percent in nominal terms as of early 2008.  
Younger savers could be targeted by offering them slightly higher minimum rates of 
return as compared to older savers. 
 
  The program should also offer the possibility of rates of return above any 
minimum guaranteed levels.  The possibility for higher rates of return would depend on 
12 GDAE Working Paper No. 08-03 Policies for Funding a Response to Climate Change 
  
 
the potential for public investments in clean energy technologies to generate future 
government revenues.  The government would use the money contributed to CERAs 
solely to address climate change but the money would not simply expand existing R&D 
programs.  Two particular uses of CERA funds offer the potential to yield financial 
returns that could then be used to fund payments to CERA holders when they retire.  One 
possibility is that CERA revenue could be used to provide low-interest loans to existing 
or start-up private companies pursing climate mitigation technologies.  These loans 
would ideally allow long payback periods, and possibly grace periods.  Once the loans 
are repaid, the money would then be used to provide payments to CERA holders when 
they retire. 
 
  But the greater potential for the CERA program to generate positive financial 
returns may rest with the success of public-private partnerships.  As mentioned above, the 
U.S. strategic plan on climate change emphasizes the role of public-private partnerships, 
broadly defined as the joint provision of goods or services by collaboration between 
public and private entities.  In certain circumstances, public-private partnerships will lead 
to greater social benefits than would occur solely as a result of private investment (Scott, 
2000).  These circumstances include the development of infrastructure, research on 
generic technologies, projects with a large potential for spillover benefits, and the pursuit 
of social, rather than purely market-based, goals.  Unfortunately, there is little empirical 
evidence regarding the benefits of public-private partnerships.  A noteworthy exception is 
a study by Audretsch, et al. (2002) which evaluates the effectiveness of the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.  They 
find that the SBIR program clearly led to firms undertaking research that would not have 
taken place without the program. In reference to the funded projects, firms reported an 
expected present value rate of return in the absence of SBIR support of 25 percent, a rate 
below their reported minimum private return hurdle of 33 percent.  In other words, in the 
absence of SBIR funding the firms would not have deemed the projects financially 
viable. However, firms that received SBIR support reported an ex post average rate of 
return of 76 percent for the supported projects, well above the hurdle point.  The large 
gap between the ex post rate of return and minimum acceptable rate (76 percent versus 33 
percent) suggests that even if the government received some payback in cases when 
public support produced profitable outcomes, private firms would still receive net 
benefits from public support. 
 
  While the SBIR results cannot be considered representative of all public R&D 
investments, they suggest that large financial and social gains can accrue.  Thus public 
R&D funding related to climate change using public-private partnerships may ultimately 
produce financial rates of return well above the minimum levels necessary to attract firms 
to such partnerships.  Given this possibility, a condition of the partnership could be that 
the government will share in the financial returns that accrue as a result of partnership.  
The situation could be likened to a venture capitalist firm that funds risky business 
opportunities in order to receive a financial return.  Not all investments would yield a 
positive return but others would likely be highly profitable.  In fact, private venture 
capital investments in clean energy are growing rapidly and could comprise ten percent 
of all venture capital investments by 2009, up from one to three percent during 1999-
13 GDAE Working Paper No. 08-03 Policies for Funding a Response to Climate Change 
  
 
2001 (Parker and O’Rourke, 2006). Government investments from CERAs should be 
designed to complement, rather than crowd out, private investments. 
 
  To ensure an efficient use of CERA funds (and limit cronyism), it is 
recommended the distribution of funds be managed by an independent panel comprised 
of experts with backgrounds in such fields as energy technology, climate science, and 
socially responsible investing.  The government would eventually sell its stock holdings 
in private equity markets to fund retirement payments to CERA holders.  Thus in the long 
run the government would phase out all ownership of equities. 
 
  The potential for CERA investment to yield positive rates of return will depend 
on the ability of low-carbon energy technologies to compete with fossil fuel energy in the 
future.  The analysis by Anderson (2006) indicates that even in the long run (more than 
20 years) most low-carbon technologies will not be directly competitive with fossil fuel 
energy sources.  Only in the presence of substantial carbon pricing would low-carbon 
technologies gain a competitive advantage.  Other results, however, suggest that some 
renewable technologies may already be competitive with fossil fuel energy.  The Nuclear 
Energy Agency, et al. (2005) estimates the current costs of generating electricity from 
wind power to be $35-$95 per Mwh, overlapping with the costs of coal ($25-$50) and gas 
($37-$60).  Analysis by the American Wind Energy Association (2001) also shows wind 
energy to currently be cost competitive with higher-carbon electricity technologies. 
 
  While loan repayments and public-private partnerships can provide funds to make 
payments to retired CERA holders, it is possible that the program will not be self-funding 
and additional revenue will need to be raised to make payments to CERA holders when 
they retire.  Rather than raising the revenue for any shortfall from income or other broad 
taxes, this paper suggests that the gap be filled by future taxes on carbon-based energy.  
Any necessary taxes would be minimal towards the start of the CERA program but then 
gradually increase as more CERA holders retire.  The idea that carbon taxes should 




CERA Simulation Model 
 
    This section of the paper explores the potential costs of the CERA program over 
time using a simple simulation model.  The simulation estimates the annual withdrawals 
made by CERA holders over time.  Most withdrawals are made once CERA holders 
retire, although some withdrawals are made prior to retirement as described below. 
 
    Analysis of the CERA program must consider the age of those who contribute.  
Following published IRS data on IRA contributions, US taxpayers are divided into age-
based cohorts of five years each (less than 15 years old, 15–20 years old, etc.).  Within 
each age cohort, all individuals are assumed to contribute into a CERA at the mid-point 
age in the cohort.  The maximum age at which contributions to a CERA are permitted is 
assumed to be 59½ years.  Similar to IRAs, it is assumed that CERA holders can 
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withdraw funds at any time but that withdrawals made before age 59½ are generally 
subject to a 10% penalty. 
 
  Real rates of return are assumed fixed for CERA contributions made by each age 
cohort but vary across cohorts in order to attract younger investors.  For the simulation, 
only the scenario of a $5 billion in additional R&D funding is analyzed.  As mentioned 
above, a CERA program of limited duration is anticipated.  It is assumed that the 
program attracts $5 billion (in real terms) in investment each year for 25 years, after 
which no further contributions are allowed.  The allocation of the $5 billion annual 
investment across cohorts is based on the distribution of IRA contributions by age group 
(Sailer and Nutter, 2004) but is slightly modified to represent a younger distribution of 
investors.  Table 2 indicates the percentage of annual CERA contributions received from 
investors in each age cohort.  The table also shows the assumed real rates of return 
applied to each cohort, ranging from two to three percent in real terms. 
 
  The withdrawal of funds by CERA holders of different ages is developed based 
on IRS statistics on the withdrawal of IRA funds (Sailer and Nutter, 2004).  As shown in 
Figure 2, about 25-30% of IRA withdrawals are made by those younger than age 59½, 
which in most cases incurs a 10% penalty.  The simulation model includes withdrawals 
made prior to retirement age, adjusted for each age cohort based on the IRS data.  The 
penalties for early withdraw are returned to the CERA program.  Figure 2 also shows that 
only about one percent of IRA withdrawals are made by those over age 80.  In the 
simulation it is assumed that all CERA accounts are depleted by age 85. 
 











Rate of Return 
Under 15  1% 50,000  3.0% 
15-20 Years  1% 50,000  3.0% 
20-25 Years  4% 200,000 3.0% 
25-30 Years  7% 350,000 3.0% 
30-35 Years  12% 600,000 2.7% 
35-40 Years  14% 700,000 2.7% 
40-45 Years  18% 900,000 2.3% 
45-50 Years  18% 900,000 2.3% 
50-55 Years  15% 750,000 2.0% 
55-60 Years  10% 500,000 2.0% 










Table 2   Assumptions of CERA Simulation 
 
  The simulation is run until all payments to CERA account holders have been 
made, which is 97 years from the start of the program (the youngest investors are age 
twelve at the start of the simulation; such investors contribute for each year until Year 25, 
then they withdraw CERA funds until they reach age 85). 
 
 








































































Figure 2   IRA Withdrawals by Age Cohort, 2000 data 
Source: Sail and Nutter (2004).. 
 
 
  The results are presented in Figure 3. Total withdrawals start off low as most 
CERA contributors are less than retirement age.  Withdrawals reach $2.0 billion after 13 
years, $3.0 billion after 18 years, and $4.0 billion after 23 years.  Recall that the 
simulation assumes annual contributions of $5.0 billion for 25 years.  By the time 
contributions cease annual withdraws are approximately $4.7 billion.  Thus at the end of 
the 25 years withdrawals are nearly equal to annual CERA contributions.  When 
contributions cease in the 25
th year, withdrawals continue to increase, reaching $4.8 
billion in the 32
nd year.  Then withdrawals steadily decline, falling below $1.0 billion in 
the 65
th year and reaching zero in the 98
th year.  Total withdrawals by CERA holders over 













































Figure 3   Simulated Annual Withdrawals from CERA Program (Millions of 
real dollars) 
 




  As mentioned previously, revenues from loan repayments and public-private 
partnerships are expected to at least partially fund payments to CERA holders.  The 
analysis now considers how much revenue could be generated under different 
assumptions.  It is assumed that revenue from these two sources would begin only after a 
lag period to allow time for new technologies to be introduced to markets and become 
profitable.  A lag period of 10 years is assumed between the time CERA contributions are 
made and the time returns begin to be generated from those contributions.  Also, it is 
assumed that not all the public-private ventures begun as a result of the CERA program 
will be viable – some ventures will fail and generate no future revenues.  This analysis 
considers three revenue scenarios: 
 
1.  returns on 30 percent of CERA contributions; rate of return of 5 percent for 15 years 
2.  returns on 50 percent of CERA contributions; rate of return of 10 percent for 15 years 
3.  returns on 60 percent of CERA contributions; rate of return of 12 percent for 20 years 
 
  For example, in the second scenario a return of 10 percent is obtained on half of a 
CERA contribution of $5 billion made in Year 1 beginning in Year 11 and continuing 
until Year 25 ($250 million per year).  Note that the returns are calculated as a percentage 
of the initial CERA contribution and that the calculations do not include repayment of 
any principal.  Thus the rate of return in the first two scenarios does not even reflect a 
return sufficient to payback the original investment.  Figure 4 displays the revenue 
streams generated under each of these three assumptions, along with the estimated 


















































Figure 4   CERA Revenues under Alternative Assumptions 
 
  Figure 4 illustrates that the first two revenue scenarios clearly do not fully fund 
CERA withdrawals by account holders.  In the first scenario, revenues from loan 
repayments and public-private partnerships fund only about 15 percent of CERA 
payments.  In the second scenario, revenues are sufficient to fund half of CERA GDAE Working Paper No. 08-03 Policies for Funding a Response to Climate Change 
  
 
obligations throughout the life of the program. Yet in the third scenario, with the most 
optimistic revenue assumptions, CERA payment obligations are fully met with the 
generated revenues and the program is essentially self-funding.  Note that in the third 
scenario withdrawals exceed revenues during the first 19 years of the program, then 
revenues exceed withdrawals for years 20-44, and withdrawals exceed revenues beyond 
the 44
th year.  Thus the government would need to borrow against future revenues for the 
early years of the program but then be able to invest excess revenues in the middle years 
of the program, creating a “trust fund” that would then be used to fund CERA payments 
towards the latter years of the program. 
 
  In the first two revenue scenarios other revenue sources would be required to 
meet the estimated shortfall.  Again, this analysis considers taxes on carbon emissions or 
gasoline.  One possibility is to estimate the required taxes as a constant rate throughout 
the duration of the program.  However, given that the ability of the CERA program to 
generate revenues through loan repayments and public-private partnerships would be 
unknown at the beginning of the program, any tax set at inception would most likely need 
to be adjusted once actual returns were known.  Instead, the required tax rates are 
calculated each year as the amount necessary to close the gap between CERA revenues 
and withdrawals in Figure 4.  In addition to the two scenarios above which would require 
closing a funding gap, a worst-case scenario is considered in which the CERA program 
generates no revenues at all from loan repayments and public-private partnerships.  For 
simplicity, the analysis holds carbon emissions and gasoline consumption constant at 
current levels. 
 
  Table 3 displays the results.  The maximum tax is the required tax rate at the 
largest annual gap between withdrawals and revenues.  The average tax is calculated over 
the 97-year duration of the CERA program.  These estimates can be compared to the 
taxes required to fund a $5 billion annual increase in R&D without the CERA program 
shown in Table 1.  Of course, the tax rates in Table 3 are lower than those in Table 1 
because of the long duration of the program.  Under the worst-case scenario in which no 
CERA returns are generated, the required carbon taxes average well below $1.00 per ton 
CO2 and the average gas tax is only 1.5 cents per gallon.  In the scenarios with some 
CERA returns, the required taxes are quite low – if the shortfall were met through a tax 






  One component of an adequate U.S. response to climate change would be a 
significant increase in public R&D funding related to climate change.  This paper has 
demonstrated the financial feasibility of at least doubling such R&D funding.  One 
approach to raising the necessary public revenue would be to institute a tax on carbon 
emissions or to increase gasoline taxes.  The tax levels required to fund a dramatic 
increase in climate change R&D would still be well below most estimates of socially 
efficient tax levels.   
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Table.3   Required Taxes to Fund CERA Shortfall under Alternative Assumptions 
 
   An alternative to raising current taxes would be to institute a program of Clean 
Energy Retirement Accounts.  Through voluntary contributions to CERAs individuals 
could boost savings for retirement while supporting U.S. efforts to combat climate 
change.  An appealing aspect of the CERA program is that most of the costs, in terms of 
payments made to retirees, are deferred until the future.  Most economic analyses of 
climate change suggest little deviation from a business-as-usual strategy because even 
relatively low discount rates diminish future climate change damages while costs must be 
paid now (Ackerman and Finlayson, 2006).  The CERA program allows costs to be 
distributed over a longer time horizon.  While the CERA program might eventually 
require minor taxes on carbon emissions or gasoline, those taxes would be paid by those 
directly benefiting from efforts to reduce climate change, and more likely to have access 
to low-carbon technologies. 
 
    The CERA program may be considered an unnecessary bureaucratic complication 
compared to, for example, simply raising gas taxes a few cents per gallon or obtaining the 
revenue out of general tax funds.  But another potential advantage of a CERA program is 
that it gives individuals a direct stake in the success of climate change efforts.  Given that 
CERA returns will depend on the success of ventures funded by the program, those who 
invest in CERAs will have an incentive to support clean energy technologies when they 
are introduced to markets.  A CERA program can also be viewed as a means of 
increasing democratic participation by empowering citizens to direct resources towards a 
specific public concern.  Similar to the concept of participatory budgeting, whereby 
public budget allocations are determined by a democratic exchange of stakeholders rather 
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than by elected officials
3, a CERA program would create a new public arena for active 
citizenship. 
 
  The evidence that humanity needs to reverse the increase in carbon emissions is 
compelling.  Global efforts to address climate change have so far been inadequate to the 
task.  Breakthrough technologies that could significantly reduce global emissions of 
carbon do not appear to be forthcoming in the immediate future.  The time lag between 
basic scientific research and the widespread commercial availability of alternatives to 
high-carbon technologies is likely to be measured in decades.  Thus an intensified search 
for low-carbon alternatives is needed immediately.  A country that takes the lead in the 
development of low-carbon technologies will likely be in an enviable competitive 
position in a future which is characterized by higher carbon prices, whether driven by 
carbon reduction policies or by market developments including depletion of oil reserves.  
The analysis presented here indicates that the U.S. could take such a leadership position 
at surprisingly little cost. 
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3 See Novy and Leubolt (2005) for an application of participatory budgeting in Brazil. 
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